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I. Introduction
Assessing the “state” of election law is a precarious venture. 1
Election law has been in a state of flux for more than a half century
as the Voting Rights Act and Supreme Court decisions have been
employed in an apparently never-ending tumult of litigation that
is driven as much by partisan interests as it is to secure a
particular vision of what constitutes a free and fair electoral
system. 2 In part, the ongoing litigation is a result of courts gaining
∗ Mark Rush is Stanley D. and Nikki Waxberg Professor of Politics and
Law and Director of the Center for International Education at Washington and
Lee University.
1. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is The Right To Vote Really Fundamental?, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 146 (2008) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s current ad
hoc jurisprudence for election law cases creates confusion regarding what it
means to enjoy the fundamental right to vote.”).
2. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the
New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 178 (2007) (“As with other legislation,
disagreements about the [Voting Rights Act]’s meaning were passed on to the
courts, and various legislators attempted to manipulate legislative history for
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new and better information about the electoral process as litigants
return to re-argue cases or present new cases with nuanced
differences from prior ones. 3 As well, the process of litigation has
demonstrated that notions of democracy are undergoing change. 4
Accordingly, the assumptions on which early decisions were based
are challenged as new decisions bring new information.
A good example of this is, perhaps, the shift over time from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot 5 to the oneperson, one vote decisions in Baker v. Carr 6 and Reynolds v. Sims 7
to the cases concerning the creation of majority-minority districts
under the auspices of section two of the VRA and constrained by
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Thornburg v. Gingles, 8 Shaw v. Reno, 9 Miller v. Johnson, 10 Easley
partisan ends.”).
3. See Samuel Issacharoff, Does Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Still
Work?, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 107, 112 (David L. Epstein et
al. eds., 2006) (“The striking feature about [Georgia v.] Ashcroft was the
willingness of the entire Court to abandon the formal Beer standard for
retrogression in favor of a more nuanced assessment of the on-the-ground
political realities of a jurisdiction.”).
4. See John Powell, Campaign Finance Reform Is a Voting Rights Issue:
The Campaign Finance System as the Latest Incarnation of the Politics of
Exclusion, 5 AFR. -AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 8 (2002) (hypothesizing that the practical
response to vote dilution claims may place this country’s most basic notions of
democracy at stake.”).
5. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding when state
power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right, it
is not insulated from federal judicial review).
6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237, 242 (1962) (reversing the dismissal
of plaintiff’s complaint because redistricting issues present a justiciable question
since one person’s vote cannot weigh more heavily than another’s vote).
7. See Reynolds v. Sims, 374 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1963) (affirming the district
court’s decision to invalidate existing and proposed plans for the apportionment
of Alabama’s bicameral legislature because the plans violated “one person one
vote.”).
8. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (finding that, except in
one district, the redistricting plan violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by
impairing the opportunity of black voters to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice).
9. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (deciding that appellants
stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging the North Carolina
General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting
districts because of their race).
10. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920, 924 (1995) (explaining that the
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v. Cromartie 11). I discuss these in greater detail below. But, for the
purposes of introduction, I note here that this transition entailed
the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “uncouth” gerrymander that
was designed to cut black voters out of Tuskegee, AL, 12 to ongoing,
protracted litigation to establish rules for drawing boundaries of
voting districts for the sole purpose of ensuring minority
representational opportunity while simultaneously providing
enough evidence to suggest that race did not “predominate” in the
process of line-drawing. 13 The result has been the creation of
districts much more “uncouth” than the boundary of Tuskegee was
in Gomillion.
A similar example would be the shift from an environment
animated by a powerful VRA that could be used to prevent or stop
a plethora of electoral practices designed either explicitly or sub
rosa to prevent voter participation (literacy tests, poll taxes, etc.)
to one in which a VRA weakened by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Shelby v. Holder is unable to prevent the erection of new
barriers to electoral participation masquerading in the form of
voter identification laws designed to prevent fraud. 14
redistricting was so bizarre on its face that it was unexplainable on grounds other
than race and therefore it could not be upheld unless it was narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest, but compliance with antidiscrimination laws
alone was not a compelling state interest).
11. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (determining that the
district court’s findings were clearly erroneous because appellees failed to show
that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in
alternative, racially balanced ways).
12. See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into The Political Thicket: Racial and
Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1525–26
(1994) (noting that the Supreme Court in Gomillion rejected the argument that a
law altering the city limits from a square to “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure” presented a non-justiciable political question).
13. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1285
(M.D. Ala. 2013) (finding that the district court erred by considering Alabama’s
goal of obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a relevant factor
to determine whether race was a predominate factor in redrawing the electoral
districts); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D.
Va. 2015) (holding voters failed to meet their burden of proof to show that race
was the predominate factor motivating 11 out of 12 voting districts and the 1
voting district motivated by race was to comply with federal antidiscrimination
law).
14. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the
coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the VRA, which was used to determine the
states and political subdivisions subject to Section 5 preclearance, was
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In this Article, I discuss the current state of election law with
regard to these two themes of redistricting and access to the polls.
These issues reflect two of the three “generations” of voting rights
litigation that Lani Guinier set forth in Tyranny of the Majority,
written in 1994, and several law review articles from the same
period. 15 The ongoing litigation demonstrates that the issues of fair
representation and effective participation that Guinier and many
others grappled with are truly complex and do not lend themselves
to easy or quick judicial or legislative resolution. 16 This is due, in
large part, to the complexity and diversity of the different strains
of democratic theory. 17 I bring the article to a close with a
discussion of the current controversy surrounding the Electoral
College and how it, too, manifests the tensions that haunt
democratic theory and the course of election law in the United
States. 18
II. The Current Context: Redistricting

unconstitutional). Compare Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
209 (2008) (upholding Indiana’s universally applicable voter-identification law
because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo
identification is not severe), with N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831
F.3d 204, 241–42 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the North Carolina law requiring photo
ID, reducing the days of early voting, and eliminating same-day registration, outof-precinct voting, and preregistration were enacted with racially discriminatory
intent in violation of the Voting Rights Act).
15. See generally LANI GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing our Politics in Court:
Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 545 (2003) (noting that questions of democratic theory,
including fair representation are both complex and often intractable).
17. See Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance,
59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 908 (2008) (stating legislation surrounding the VRA cannot
account for every democratic theory so there must always be trade-offs).
18. See Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is
Unconstitutional, 2012 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1523, 1579 (2012) (noting critics of the
electoral college believe it is contrary to the democratic theory because
aggregating popular votes into electoral votes may produce a President who
received fewer popular votes than another candidate).
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As of this writing, the most recent redistricting case to reach
the Supreme Court came from Virginia and concerns the drafting
of state legislative district lines. 19 The case addresses the
constitutionality of twelve state legislative districts that were
drawn to comply with Section 2 of the VRA. 20 They were created to
ensure that they were majority-minority districts and, therefore,
provided the minority population with an opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. 21 The plaintiffs appealed the lower court
ruling that upheld the districting plan in the face of an Equal
Protection challenge that alleged that the districts comprised
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. 22
The key issue in the case was the extent to which it could be
argued that racial considerations “predominated” in the process of
drawing the district lines. 23 While Section 2 of the VRA essentially
required that race must be a factor in drawing district lines, 24 the
Court has also ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
predominance of race in the construction of those districts. 25 As the
19. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 553–
54 (E.D. Va. 2015) (deciding that voters failed to meet their burden of proof to
show that race was the predominate factor motivating 11/12 voting districts and
the one voting district motivated by race was to comply with federal
antidiscrimination law).
20. See id. at 510 (“This case challenges the constitutionality of twelve
Virginia House of Delegates districts . . . as racial gerrymanders in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States.”).
21. See id. at 520 (addressing Delegate Jones’ argument that the majorityminority districts in the proposed legislation had a black voting-age population
(BVAP) of 55% or higher).
22. See id. at 512 (noting the plaintiffs appealed the lower court’s ruling).
23. See id. at 510 (determining that Plaintiffs have the burden of proof to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race was the predominate factor).
24. See id. at 515 (citing Section 2 of the VRA); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301
(2016) (prohibiting any voting practice that abridges or denies any US citizen the
right to vote based on race).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws.”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 642 (1993) (deciding that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s case
for failure to state a claim because “the central purpose of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prevent the states from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 905 (1995) (finding that the redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because “the redistricting was so bizarre on its face that it was
unexplainable on grounds other than race.”).
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District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated,
legislatures are forced to navigate between these two constraints:
Therein lies the rub. To comply with federal statutory command
(the VRA), the State must consider and account for race in
drawing legislative districts in order to craft a compliant plan.
However, to avoid violating the federal constitution, the State
must not subordinate traditional, neutral principles to racial
considerations in drawing district boundaries. 26

The debates in the oral argument were strained because
members of the Court believed they had resolved this issue in their
most recent redistricting decision. 27 Justice Breyer stated in the
Bethune-Hill oral argument that he had hoped that the Alabama
Black Legislative Caucus decision “would end these cases in this
Court.” 28 In Bethune-Hill, Virginia had used a 55% minority
population threshold for the creation of the 12 majority-minority
districts. 29 Bethune-Hill challenged this threshold as the
equivalent of an admissions quota that the Supreme Court has
declared unconstitutional in Bakke v. Regents of the University of
California and Grutter v. Bollinger. 30
Virginia had set forth several criteria for drawing legislative
districts. 31 These included:

26. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517 (E.D.
Va. 2015).
27. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 15-680) (arguing that the
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus should have ended the majority-minority line
of cases).
28. See id. (“I mean, look, which I’m sure you’ve read, in--in the Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus, which I had hoped [sic] would end these cases in this
Court, which it certainly doesn’t seem to have done--all right?”).
29. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“[T]he 55% BVAP figure was
used
in
structuring
the districts and
in
assessing
whether
the
redistricting plan satisfied constitutional standards and the VRA.”).
30. See id. at 530–31 (rejecting the comparison to an admissions quota);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1978) (striking down a
higher education admissions program that reserved a specific number of seats for
minority applicants).
31. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 518 (setting forth several criteria
for drawing legislative districts).
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1. Population Equality. Populations in House of Delegates
districts could deviate by no more than one percent of the
average population);
2. Voting Rights Act. Districts had to be drawn in a manner that
complied with “protections against the unwarranted
retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic minority voting
strength.”;
3. Contiguity and Compactness;
4. All districts had to be single member districts;
5. Communities of Interest. The districts would be drawn based
on “legislative consideration of the varied factors that can create
or contribute to communities of interest.” (Such as economic,
cultural, geographic factors, etc.);
6. Priority. Maintaining equal district populations, abiding by
state and federal constitutional requirements and complying
with the VRA were given priority among the factors noted
above. 32

Plaintiffs contended that Virginia’s use of the 55% minority
population standard demonstrated that racial considerations
predominated over the other traditional, neutral redistricting
principles. 33 Plaintiffs cited the Supreme Court’s earlier decision
in Alabama Black Legislative Caucus where it rejected Alabama’s
use of a similar population threshold:
We have said that the plaintiff’s burden in a racial
gerrymandering case is “to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to
place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district.” That Alabama expressly adopted and
applied a policy of prioritizing mechanical racial targets above
all other districting criteria (save one-person, one-vote) provides
evidence that race motivated the drawing of particular lines in
multiple districts in the State. And neither the use of statewide
evidence nor the effort to show widespread effect can transform
a racial gerrymandering claim about a set of individual districts

32. Id. at 518.
33. See id. at 566 (“The Plaintiffs simply point to the threshold’s attainment
of the 55% BVAP floor, evidence of racial correlation, and a low compactness score
to prove that race predominated.”).
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into a separate, general claim that the legislature racially
gerrymandered the State “as” an undifferentiated “whole.” 34

Alabama contended that since its population threshold was one of
several criteria for drawing district lines, race could not be
regarded as a predominant factor. 35
But, in order to abide by is interpretation of the VRA’s
nonretrogression standard, the state sought to maintain the level
of minority populations that had been effected in its 35 majority
minority districts in the prior round of redistricting. 36 To do this,
the state had to move many minority voters into the majorityminority districts because many of those districts had lost
population since the last redistricting. 37 The Court ruled, however,
that maintaining equal district populations
is not one factor among others to be weighed against the use of
race to determine whether race “predominates.” Rather it is a
part of the redistricting background, taken as a given, when
determining whether race, or other factors predominate in a
legislator’s determination as to how equal population objectives
will be met. 38

Having rejected the state’s use of equal population as a
counterbalance to the use of race, the Court determined that
Alabama’s focus on maintaining the previous levels of minority
population in the majority-minority districts comprised a
predominant use of race in the districting process. 39 As well, the
Court stated that this interpretation of the VRA’s nonretrogression
standard was erroneous because “section 5 does not require
maintaining the same population percentages in majorityminority districts as in the prior plan. Rather, § 5 is satisfied if
34. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1267 (2015).
35. See id. at 1263 (noting Alabama’s various goals in redistricting).
36. See id. (“Alabama believed that, to avoid retrogression under § 5 [of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965], it was required to maintain roughly the same black
population percentage in existing majority-minority districts.”).
37. See id. (explaining that population required Alabama to add individuals
to the districts in order to meet the State’s no-more-than-1% population-deviation
objective).
38. Id. at 1270.
39. See id. at 1267 (“That Alabama expressly adopted and applied a policy of
prioritizing mechanical racial targets above all other districting criteria (save oneperson, one-vote) provides evidence that race motivated the drawing of particular
lines in multiple districts in the State.”).
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minority voters retain the ability to elect their preferred
candidates.” 40 Accordingly, Alabama was obliged to revisit the
districting process to assess how large a population of black voters
was necessary to create the opportunity for them to elect their
preferred candidate. 41 It might, for example, have been possible to
create such an opportunity in a “crossover” or “influence” district
(in which even a district with a minority-black population could
create an opportunity for the black voters to elect a candidate of
their choice with the assistance of white or other voters who shared
their preferences. 42
The Court acknowledged that the state of election law with
regard to redistricting remains precarious:
The standards of § 5 are complex; they often require evaluation
of controverted claims about voting behavior; the evidence may
be unclear; and, with respect to any particular district, judges
may disagree about the proper outcome. The law cannot lay a
trap for an unwary legislature, condemning its redistricting
plan as either (1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering
should the legislature place a few too many minority voters in a
district or (2) retrogressive under § 5 should the legislature
place a few too few. 43

So, while states need not establish the precise level of minority
population necessary to avoid a retrogression claim, they did need
to have a “strong basis in evidence” to justify the minority
population levels they choose. 44 In Alabama’s case, the decision to
maintain previous minority population levels was too blunt an
instrument. 45
40. Id. at 1273.
41. See id. at 1274 (“[The district court and the legislature] should have
asked: ‘To what extent must we preserve existing minority percentages in order
to maintain the minority’s present ability to elect the candidate of its choice?’”).
42. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (explaining that it is
not necessarily retrogressive for a State to replace safe majority-minority districts
with crossover or influence districts).
43. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74
(2015).
44. See id. at 1274 (“[A] court’s analysis of the narrow tailoring requirement
insists only that the legislature have a ‘strong basis in evidence’ in support of the
(race-based) choice that it has made.”).
45. See id. at 1261 (“Section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to
maintain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction
to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice.”).
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The Virginia redistricting plan was effected before the
Supreme Court ruled in Alabama. In Bethune-Hill, the challenges
to the state legislative districts were based on essentially the same
situation that had existed in Alabama. 46 The principal difference
was that Virginia had used a 55% minority population threshold
for all majority-minority districts (instead of using the prior
district’s population levels as Alabama had done). 47 Nonetheless,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sustained the
legislative redistricting plan. 48
The court reasoned that Virginia’s districting plan was
constitutional because there was sufficient evidence to indicate
that the 55% threshold did not demonstrate that race had
predominated in the districting process. 49 Virginia’s use of the
several districting criteria noted above and its additional desire to
ensure partisan balance in the state legislature demonstrated that
the 55% threshold was not a “filter” through which all other
criteria had passed. 50
In the oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices
and attorneys reviewed the definition of “predominance.” 51 The
predominance “standard” was first set forth in Miller v. Johnson
where the Court stated that, in an equal protection challenge to a
redistricting plan,
The plaintiff’s burden is to show, either through circumstantial
evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to
place a significant number of voters within or without a
particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove
that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles including, but not limited to compactness,

46. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517–
19 (E.D. Va. 2015) (explaining the redistricting plan).
47. Compare Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988 F. Supp. 2d
1285 (M.D. Ala. 2013), with Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d.
48. See Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (upholding all 12 challenged
districts).
49. See id. (finding that the 55% threshold did not predominate).
50. See id. at 528 (rejecting the dissent’s “racial filter” argument).
51. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–8, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d
505 (discussing the meaning of “predominance.”).
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contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations. 52

In Bethune-Hill, the Supreme Court sustained the lower court’s
reasoning and upheld the legislature’s conclusion that it was
necessary to retain a 55% BVAP to ensure that black voters in the
75th district had “a functional working majority.” 53 The Court
reaffirmed “the basic racial predominance analysis explained in
Miller and Shaw II and the basic narrow tailoring analysis
explained in Alabama.” 54 Thus, the question endures regarding
how much thoughtful use of race—as mandated by the VRA—
becomes tantamount to “predominance” within the context of other
traditional districting principles that a state takes into account
when drawing lines. 55 But, the Court has begun to offer broad
guidance in Miller, Alabama and Bethune. Accordingly, the Court
remanded Bethune so that the district court could review the other
11 districts that were challenged.
A. Escaping the “Trap”?
Bethune-Hill manifests the results of the tortuous course that
the Supreme Court’s redistricting case law has taken. On the one
hand, states must avoid the “trap” that the case law sets if states
are unable to navigate between the Scylla of Section 2 of the VRA
and the Charybdis of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 56 On the other hand, the oral argument in BethuneHill demonstrates an appreciation for the fact that states require
some leeway in setting population targets in majority-minority

52. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
53. See generally Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S.Ct. 788
(2017).
54. Id. at 802.
55. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (outlining predominant standard); see also
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 517 (E.D. Va.
2015) (stating the need to use the predominant standard).
56. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74
(2015) (explaining the “trap” condemning a redistricting plan as either
(1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering should the legislature place a few too
many minority voters in a district or (2) retrogressive under § 5 should the
legislature place a few too few).
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districts if they are to avoid besieging the courts with unending
litigation. 57
The trap that awaits states was created by the development of
the Court’s case law from the early one-person, one vote decisions
of the 1960s, 58 through the 1980s decisions regarding how to apply
Section 2 of the VRA to redistricting plans, 59 to the equal
protection challenges to those redistricting plans in the 1990’s, 60 to
the cases in the 2000s where the Court embraced the use of
influence and crossover districts, 61 to its acknowledgment that
what appears to be a racial gerrymander may, in fact be driven by
constitutionally permissible partisan concerns. 62 This history
demonstrates that the several democratic values and visions that
inform voting rights and election law are not always
complementary. 63
The one-person, one vote standard, for example, appeared to
establish a clear-cut means for resolving redistricting conflicts
before the passage of the VRA. 64 By establishing this standard, the
Court created a clear, prophylactic legal standard that would
simplify the redistricting process and litigation. 65 But, even as
Chief Justice Warren penned his opinion in Reynolds, it was
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 505.
58. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237, 242 (1962) (establishing that one
person’s vote cannot weigh more heavily than another person’s vote); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964) (concluding political equality must mean that
one person equals one vote).
59. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 80 (1986) (explaining how to apply
§ 2 of the VRA to redistricting plans).
60. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (upholding a redistricting
claim under the Equal Protection Clause); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924
(1995) (finding a viable redistricting claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
61. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 493 (2003) (embracing the use of
influence and crossover districts).
62. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 253 (2001) (noting a need for
racial and partisan balance).
63. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 283, 294 (2014) (“[T]he Court does not base its theory of election law on
any substantive value that the democratic process is meant to realize.”).
64. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–61 (1964) (providing pre-VRA
method to resolving redistricting disputes).
65. See
Michelle
H.
Browdy,
Computer
Models
and
PostBandemer Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. 1379, 1381 (1990) (“Reynolds v. Sims and
its progeny clarified the ‘one person, one vote’ standard for political
redistricting . . . .”).
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evident that the notion of individual voting equality did not
necessarily ensure fair representational opportunity. 66 In
Reynolds, he wrote:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As
long as ours is a representative form of government, and our
legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock
of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid that a
constitutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that
certain otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited
from voting for members of their state legislature. And, if a
State should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the
State should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the
weight of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in
the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would
appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be
constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain
of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could
vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the
effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens
in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10,
while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only
at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable. Of course,
the effect of state legislative districting schemes which give the
same number of representatives to unequal numbers of
constituents is identical.
Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living
here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the
votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against
those individual voters living in disfavored areas is easily
demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not
the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of
the State. Two, five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of
their voting is equivalent to that of their favored
neighbor. Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any
method or means, merely because of where they happen to
reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that

66. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567–68 (explaining the notion that individual
voting equality did not necessarily ensure fair representational opportunity).
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the Constitution forbids “sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination.” 67

In this passage, Warren made the clear case for individual voting
equality and requiring voting districts to have equal populations. 68
There was no rational basis (let alone a compelling interest) for
discriminating among individual voters’ voting power on the basis
of where they lived. 69 Warren went on to discuss the nature of
representation. 70 In doing so, he created an unresolvable tension
within the opinion71:
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the
people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s
legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority
control of state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority
rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of
minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result. Since
legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all
citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are
collectively responsive to the popular will. And the concept of
equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the
uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to
the governmental action questioned or challenged. With respect
to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as
citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of
where they live. Any suggested criteria for the differentiation of
citizens are insufficient to justify any discrimination, as to the
weight of their votes, unless relevant to the permissible
purposes of legislative apportionment. Since the achieving of
fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly
the basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for
equal participation by all voters in the election of state
legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious
67. Id. at 562–63.
68. See id. at 577 (stating that districts should be as nearly of equal
population as possible).
69. See id. at 565 (“With respect to the allocation of legislative
representation, all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation
regardless of where they live.”).
70. See id. (discussing the nature of representation).
71. Id.
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discriminations based upon factors such as race, or economic
status. Our constitutional system amply provides for the
protection of minorities by means other than giving them
majority control of state legislatures. And the democratic ideals
of equality and majority rule, which have served this Nation so
well in the past, are hardly of any less significance for the
present and the future. 72

This passage dictates two principles that are not necessarily
consistent. 73 Equality of individual voting power does not ensure
fair and effective representational opportunity because the latter
is, by definition, a group right. 74 To provide for equal individual
voting power would require nothing more than randomly dividing
a state into voting districts of equal population. 75 But ensuring fair
and effective representational opportunity requires someone to
draw voting districts with an eye towards ensuring that groups of
voters have the opportunity to coalesce and elect representatives. 76
As the Court explained in Miller, those groups of voters may
take on any number of characteristics. 77 But, the VRA mandated
that minority groups receive privileged treatment in the
redistricting process. 78 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 79 the Court set
forth the standard for determining whether a group of minority
voters could demand that a state draw a district that would enable
it to have the opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice. 80
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan stated:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
72. Id. at 565–66.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773–76 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that redistricting based on equal apportionment of total population was
proper).
76. Id.
77. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 947 (1995) (detailing variations of
voter groups).
78. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 201, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401
(1975).
79. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs challenging a redistricting
plan under § 2 of the VRA could point to racially polarized voting to establish a
prima facie case of vote dilution without having to prove causation or intent).
80. See id. at 50–51 (outlining elements that require redistricting to
accommodate minority choice).
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majority in a single-member district. If it is not, as would be the
case in a substantially integrated district, the multi-member
form of the district cannot be responsible for minority voters’
inability to elect its candidates.
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive. If the minority group is not politically
cohesive, it cannot be said that the selection of a multimember
electoral structure thwarts distinctive minority group interests.
Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence
of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate
running unopposed, usually to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate. 81

Gingles dealt with a challenge to multimember districts in the
North Carolina legislature. 82 But, the “test” set forth by Justice
Brennan established the conditions under which a group of
minority voters could claim that a districting scheme diluted its
opportunity to elect candidates of its choice. 83 Brennan’s test was
grounded upon the Court’s reading of Section 2 of the VRA:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State
or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of
a protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
81. Id.
82. See id. at 35 (noting that appellees were challenging one single-member
and six multimember districts).
83. See id. at 50–51 (“These circumstances are necessary preconditions for
multimember districts to operate to impair minority voters’ ability to elect
representatives of their choice.”).
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considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population. 84

Accordingly, minority groups were entitled to an opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice, but they were not guaranteed
proportional representation. 85 But, the confluence of the oneperson, one-vote rule and the Gingles test quickly led to the
creation of bizarrely-shaped voting districts designed to connect
enough pockets of minority voters to ensure that they could
comprise a majority of a district’s population. 86
In Shaw v. Reno, the Court held that this process could be
taken too far. 87 Voters challenged North Carolina’s redistricting
scheme because the outline of the voting districts indicated that
they had been drawn exclusively to ensure the election of minority
candidates. 88 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor stated:
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who
may have little in common with one another but the color of
their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the
same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates
at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes. 89

Thus, to challenge a districting scheme for being dominated by
racial considerations, a plaintiff had to demonstrate “that the
legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into
different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation
lacks sufficient justification.” 90
84. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
85. Id.
86. See Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1331 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing
an odd-shaped district for signs of racial gerrymandering).
87. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
88. Id. at 633–34.
89. Id. at 647.
90. Id. at 649.
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Whereas the Gingles standard invited the creation of majorityminority districts with reckless abandon, the Shaw response relied
too much on the appearance of a district. 91 It overlooked the
possibility that an aesthetically pleasing map of legislative
districts could still be driven by racial considerations. 92
Accordingly, in Miller, the Court qualified the Shaw standard to
require a demonstration that racial considerations had
predominated the process of drawing district lines. 93
The predominance “trap” described by the Court in Alabama
remains. 94 In attempting to clarify how much racial consideration
comprises “predominance,” the Court and litigants continue to
struggle with the fact that Section 2 of the VRA essentially
mandates the consideration of race in the redistricting process. 95
So, as the case law continues to develop, the Court continues to
seek what some have referred to as a “Goldilocks” standard of
taking race into account: not too much, not too little. 96 The Court
acknowledged in Alabama and in the Bethune-Hill oral argument
91. Compare Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (establishing
a rule that led to the creation of misshapen districts in order to give minorities
more voting power), with Shaw, 509 U.S. at 667 (considering the appearance of a
district in determining its racial balance).
92. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 667–68 (finding that failing to consider racial
considerations and aesthetic appearance of districts were not mutually exclusive).
93. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915–16 (1995) (narrowing the Shaw
standard).
94. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74
(2015) (highlighting the “trap’s” existence and related problems).
95. See generally Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp.3d
505 (E.D. Va. 2015).
96. In an interview with POLITICO, Rick Hasen, election law professor at
University of California-Irvine and author of Election Law Blog, described
Bethune-Hill as an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify the standard for
racial gerrymandering cases: “It’s kind of a Goldilocks problem. You must take
race into account somewhat to comply with the Voting Rights Act, but if you take
into account too much the racial considerations you can get in trouble as well. The
question is how do you know when you’ve gotten it just right.” See Josh Gerstein,
Supreme Court Takes Case Claiming Racial Gerrymandering in Virginia,
(June
6,
2016),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-thePOLITICO
radar/2016/06/virginia-redistricting-supreme-court-223946 (last visited Apr. 19,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice); see also Pamela Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting
Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 246 (1993) (referring to the “ongoing
struggle between the Supreme Court and the political branches over how to
address the enduring problems of race in America.”).
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that compliance with the VRA is a compelling state interest. 97 But,
insofar as the Court’s case law has yet to become clearer than the
“Goldilocks” standard, states remain threatened by what one
attorney in the Bethune-Hill oral argument described as “juniorvarsity dilution claims.” 98
B. Escaping the Trap: Vote Dilution, Black Electoral Success and
the Road not Taken
States—indeed, the entire USA—could escape the trap that
haunts current voting rights litigation by jettisoning the
commitment to single-member districts in favor of multimember
districts. 99 Much has been written in favor of such a change for the
United States. 100 Advocates of political and electoral reform such
as FairVote continue to lobby for a conversion to virtually any
alternative to the single-member district system. 101 Currently,
FairVote advocates a conversion to ranked-choice voting where
voters are able to select from a field of candidates and vote for them
in order of preference. 102
There are numerous alternative forms of voting that would
diminish, if not resolve the problems that lead states into the trap
set by current election law. First, by converting five, singlemember districts into one, five-member district a state would
diminish the need to litigate over the borders of four districts.
Second, insofar as districts would be geographically larger and
have larger populations, it would be less necessary for
97. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1273–74 (noting “that
the interest in preventing § 5 retrogression” is a compelling state interest);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–27, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d.
98. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d.
99. See Douglas Amy, When Every Vote Counts: A Look at Proportional
Voting, FAIRVOTE, (Apr. 1993), http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=646 (last visited
Apr. 19, 2017) (arguing for multimember districts) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
100. Id.
101. See generally Advocacy, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/advocacy
(last visited Feb. 12, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
102. See generally Ranked Choice Voting/Instant Runoff, FAIRVOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/rcv#rcvbenefits (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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cartographers to snake district lines across the state to pick up
pockets of minority voters or Issacharoff’s “filler people” to meet
the demands of the VRA. Third, with more candidates to choose
from, voters would be much less likely to find themselves casting a
vote in an election where an incumbent is either unchallenged or
is challenged by a candidate who has no chance of winning.
There is, of course, ample criticism of alternative electoral
systems. They tend to increase the number of small parties who
can contest elections. They produce correspondingly fragmented
legislatures because the proliferation of small parties makes it
more difficult for one party to win a majority of the seats. As a
result, they tend to produce coalition governments that are not as
stable as those produced by two party systems. So, there is a
tradeoff between more legislative diversity and more voter choice
and government stability. 103
Insofar as alternative electoral systems improve the quality of
voter choice, one would think they would be part and parcel of VRA
litigation. But, insofar as the Court said in Gingles that there is no
right to proportional representation, there is no constitutional
basis to seek to convert to an alternative form of voting. 104
Nonetheless, there is no question that an alternative electoral
system as simple as a conversion to multimember districts would
resolve much of the complexity in voting rights case law. 105 Justice
Thomas suggested as much in Holder v. Hall. 106
103. See generally MARK E. RUSH & RICHARD L. ENGSTROM, FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS
(2001) (offering a comprehensive discussion of electoral reform); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF, FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (2005) (explaining how single-member districts,
particularly in nascent democracies, avoids the proliferation of political parties
and the potential problems of governability that it presents).
104. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986) (noting that the Senate
Report on the VRA provided that “the lack of proportional representation alone
does not establish a violation” of § 2 of the VRA).
105. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In
short, there are undoubtedly an infinite number of theories of effective suffrage,
representation, and the proper apportionment of political power in a
representative democracy that could be drawn upon to answer the questions
posed in Allen.”).
106. See id. (articulating that a court must find a reasonable alternative
practice to use as a benchmark to compare with the existing voting practice in a
vote dilution case under § 2 of the VRA).
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Holder entailed a suit by minority voters to challenge Bleckley
County, Georgia’s decision not to convert from a single
commissioner system of government to a five-district commission
of government. 107 The state legislature had authorized counties to
convert to multimember systems. 108 However, voters in a
referendum rejected the conversion in Bleckley County. 109
Plaintiffs challenged the result of the referendum because
maintaining the single commissioner system essentially prevented
African American voters from gaining representation (since they
comprised a minority of the voting-age population). 110 Speaking for
the Majority, Justice Kennedy said that there was no basis on
which to challenge a decision not to change an electoral system.
Even if there were a constitutional case, there was no standard for
determining in Holder the size of the new government: “As the
facts of this case well illustrate, the search for a benchmark is quite
problematic when a § 2 dilution challenge is brought to the size of
a government body. There is no principled reason why one size
should be picked over another as the benchmark for
comparison.” 111
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas challenged the Court to
confront the doctrinal decisions and assumptions it had made as it
had developed its VRA case law. The Court had established a
preference for single-member voting districts without considering
other choices of electoral systems. Thomas explained:
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the philosophy that has
emerged in vote dilution decisions…has been the Court’s
preference for single member districting schemes, both as a
benchmark for measuring undiluted minority voting strength
and as a remedial mechanism for guaranteeing minorities
107. See id. at 877 (describing the basis for the claim).
108. See id. (explaining that the Georgia state legislature authorized Bleckley

County to adopt a multimember commission in 1985 and noting that all but about
ten counties in Georgia had converted to multimember districts).
109. See id. (stating that local voters rejected the adoption of a multimember
commission in a 1986 referendum, despite having approved a multimember
district plan for the county school board only four years earlier).
110. See id. at 878 (noting the respondents’ assertion that “Bleckley County
must have a county commission of sufficient size that, with single-member
election districts, the county’s black citizens would constitute a majority in one of
the single-member districts.”).
111. Id. at 881.

404

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2017)
undiluted voting power. Indeed, commentators surveying the
history of voting rights litigation have concluded that it has
been the objective of voting rights plaintiffs to use the Act to
attack multimember districting schemes and to replace them
with single member districting systems drawn with majority
minority districts to ensure minority control of seats.
It should be apparent, however, that there is no principle
inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of
the Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single member
districts the “proper” mechanism for electing representatives to
governmental bodies or for giving “undiluted” effect to the votes
of a numerical minority. On the contrary, from the earliest days
of the Republic, multimember districts were a common feature
of our political systems . . . . Today, although they have come
under increasing attack under the Voting Rights Act,
multimember district systems continue to be a feature on the
American political landscape, especially in municipal
governments.
The obvious advantage the Court has perceived in single
member districts, of course, is their tendency to enhance the
ability of any numerical minority in the electorate to gain
control of seats in a representative body. But in choosing single
member districting as a benchmark electoral plan on that basis
the Court has made a political decision and, indeed, a decision
that itself depends on a prior political choice … In other words,
in an effort to develop standards for assessing claims of dilution,
the Court has adopted the view that members of any
numerically significant minority are denied a fully effective use
of the franchise unless they are able to control seats in an
elected body. 112

This decision to prefer single-member districts conditioned the
Court’s reasoning going forward and, as we see above, led to the
trap that the Court described in Alabama. 113
There is a more pernicious aspect of this decision that Lani
Guinier pointed out in 1991. 114 Anticipating Thomas’s criticism in
Holder, Guinier argued that the Court and voting rights litigation
112. Id. at 897–99 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1273–74
(2015) (highlighting the “trap’s” existence and related problems).
114. See Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15, at 1081
(explaining that “black electoral success theory evolved from the civil rights
movement’s empowerment vision,” in response to “pressure for judicial
supervision of the movement’s political agenda.”).
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had developed a theory and vision of “black electoral success” that
actually did not comport with the original vision of the VRA. 115
Guinier argued that while the focus on creating single-member
majority-minority districts “may result in the election of more
black officials, it ignores the movement's concern with broadening
the base of participation and fundamentally reforming the
substance of political decisions.” 116 Thus, she contended, majorityminority districts may ensure more representatives, but they “may
not necessarily result in more responsive government.” 117 If a
polity were racially polarized the election of a few minority
legislators would do little to advance the interests of their
constituents. 118
Furthermore—and perhaps even more pernicious—Guinier
suggested that the black electoral success theory’s focus on
majority minority districts “ignores critical connections between
broad-based, sustained voter participation and accountable
representation.” 119 That is, ensuring the success of minority
elected officials will not necessarily enhance the fortunes of their
constituents. 120
The impact of electoral success theory (for all legislators, not
just minority representatives) is evident throughout the
redistricting process. Incumbents and redistricters work together
to move voters back and forth to create just the right balance to
meet the mandates of the VRA and the desires of incumbents to
make their districts more secure. In the oral argument for
Bethune-Hill and the Court’s discussion in Alabama, judges and
attorneys focused on the numbers of voters and their races shuttled
in and out of districts.
115. Id.

116. Id. at 1080.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1116 (“Because the individual black elected official may not be
able to overcome polarization to ‘infiltrate the decision making process’ at the
legislative level, the election of black representatives does not, by itself, translate
into intergroup cooperation.”).
119. Id. at 1080.
120. See id. at 1134 (explaining that one of black electoral success theory’s
failings ensured that “legislative responsiveness would not be secured merely by
the election day ratification of black representatives. Rather, legislative
responsiveness would depend on citizen participation, legislative presence, and
legislative success in meeting the needs of a disadvantaged group.”).
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What is clear is that the goal of creating districts to ensure
particular outcomes (the election of a minority legislator, the
return of an incumbent) drives the redistricting process. What is
not clear is whether or how the interests of constituents are
regarded beyond their roles as filler people in legislative districts.
As noted in the oral argument in Bethune-Hill:
The lines weren’t there because, oh, we have this 55% BVAP
target and everything had to go out the window. [Delegate
Jones] said, well, you know, down there in Southampton Roads,
we have three incumbents that are all close together because
this part of the state lost a lot of population. So, I drew some
zigs and zags here to keep the three incumbents separate . . . 121

The role and impact of incumbency is, perhaps, the most
important point raised in Bethune-Hill. As the following excerpt
from the oral argument demonstrates, the Court addressed the fact
that strong incumbents can change the voting profile of a district.
In this case, it was acknowledged that an incumbent’s retirement
could actually undermine the purpose of creating the majorityminority district in the first place. 122 In this exchange, Marc Elias
(plaintiff’s attorney) veered from the discussion of the definition of
“predominate” to consider the impact of incumbency on district
voting patterns:
JUSTICE ALITO: Wasn't there a primary in 2005 in that
district where Representative Tyler won over a white candidate
by less than 300 votes?
MR. ELIAS: Yes, Your Honor. And I’m glad you raise that,
because that’s the third one, and that is the most important one.
Let us take a step back, because it’s–it’s interesting that he—
that he—he won by more–she won by more than—by—by only
300 votes. The districts were drawn in two thousand–in—in
two—following 2000. In 2001, there was an incumbent who had
been there 30-some-odd years who was a candidate of choice of
the African-American community who won. That candidate won
again in a landslide in 2003.That candidate then retired, and it
was then an open primary. And in that open primary, Delegate
Tyler won by five percentage points.

121. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 141 F.Supp.3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015).
122. Id. at 22–24.
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Now, what’s interesting is that 300 votes is five percentage
points. This was a 6,000-vote primary. Five-way. So to say she
won by 300 votes and that proves predominance, well, she won
in a landslide. She won five—by five percentage points as a nonincumbent in a multiple-primary field.
JUSTICE KAGAN: I thought she won by only, like, 1 1/2
percentage points in the general.
MR. ELIAS: In the general. So what happened next is that the
incumbent, who had retired, whose son had run against her in
the primary, who she had beaten, he then endorses the
Republican opponent. So you have this long-time incumbent
who endorses the Republican opponent, and she wins by 1.3
percent of the vote in the general.
JUSTICE ALITO: But these—these districts are going to last
for a decade, are they not?
MR. ELIAS: Correct.
JUSTICE ALITO: And—and there’s no guarantee that these
same candidates are going to be running throughout that
decade.
MR. ELIAS: I agree.
JUSTICE ALITO: So you think they have to take into account
this very complicated analysis: Well, it was the—the person is
an incumbent, and therefore is going to have the incumbent’s
advantage, and -MR. ELIAS: No, Your Honor, I’m saying the complete opposite.
I’m saying that in 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009, this was—this
performed without a close election. In 2005 the primary was not
close; it was a five-point election. So that leaves us one election,
which was the 2005 general where she won by 1.3 percent of the
vote.
JUSTICE KAGAN: Which you’re saying, essentially, is
idiosyncratic.
MR. ELIAS: It’s—it’s an idiosyncratic one election. But also,
this Court has never said that it is a guarantee that they will
win. It—in fact, in Gingles itself, there was a statement that it
is not a guarantee—that no one election controls.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I mean, that gets to an interesting
point. What—to what—what degree of confidence that it will
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remain a—a majority-minority district is necessary to have a
strong basis in evidence? 123

This is a vitally important development. 124 To the extent that the
Court and attorneys acknowledge that a district’s voting profile is
tied to the choices presented to voters on Election Day, it
demonstrates that voter behavior is dependent on district-based
conditions. 125 In the context of majority-minority districts, Justice
Alito’s comment in the exchange in Bethune uses an unfortunate
choice of words. 126 A district would still be majority-minority
because of its racial composition. 127 But, that majority might not
coalesce around and elect one candidate even though the district is
constructed to give minority voters the opportunity to do so. 128
Of course, electing minority representatives is vital to
ensuring that a legislature hears the voices of a diversity of
constituents. 129 But, the manner in which those voices are heard
does not necessarily depend on creating single-member districts
that ensure the election of particular candidates. 130 The exchange
above demonstrates that voters will behave differently when
presented with different choices. 131 Accordingly, drawing majorityminority districts that minimize voter choice clearly benefits
incumbent legislators more than voters. 132 An alternative,
123. Id.
124. See id. (shifting focus from predominance to the effect of incumbency on
district voting).
125. See id. (recognizing that incumbency is an issue).
126. See id. (confusing how a district would be classified based on racial
composition).
127. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208 (2003) (discussing
majority-minority districts and race).
128. See id. at 2209 (explaining that a minority could still win in a district
where the majority is white).
129. See id. at 2211–12 (stating that, without diversity, minorities will not
have an equal opportunity to be heard).
130. See id. at 2209–10 (stating that a coalitional district will allow minorities’
voices to be heard).
131. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–24, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 141 F.Supp.3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015) (delineating the different
outcomes in different elections).
132. See Grant Hayden, Majority-Minority Voting Districts and Their Role in
Politics: Their Advantages, Their Drawbacks, and the Current Law, FINDLAW
(Oct. 7, 2004), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/majority-minority-
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multimember districting plan would give voters more choices,
minimize gerrymandering driven by electoral success and perhaps
get states out of the trap set by the current state of voting rights
law. 133 But, until the Court entertains a challenge to singlemember districts, the trap will remain in place and the theory of
black electoral success will prevail. 134
III. Access to the Vote: Voter Identification Requirements in the
Wake of Shelby v. Holder
In what will certainly be regarded as one of the more
unfortunate sequences of decisions, the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana’s voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County 135
and then struck down Section 4 of the VRA in Shelby County v.
Holder. 136 137 In so doing, the Court unleashed state legislatures to
restrict access to polling stations on Election Day. 138 In addition,
by striking down Section 4 of the VRA (which set forth the criteria
by which states or other political subdivisions were subject to the
preclearance provisions of Section 5), the Court enabled states that
had been subject to preclearance to erect hurdles to voter
voting-districts-and-their-role-in-politics.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(illustrating that drawing a majority-minority district involves pulling minority
voters from other districts, which dilutes minority voting power) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
133. See ACE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, THE ACE ENCYCLOPEDIA:
BOUNDARY
DELIMITATION
22–23
(2013),
http://aceproject.org/aceen/pdf/bd/at_download/file (detailing the advantages of multimember districts).
134. See id. (stating that single-member districts have the disadvantage of
unequal representation).
135. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
136. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
137. See Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-oneyear-later (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing effects of the Shelby holding) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see
also Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr.
28, 2008), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/crawford-v-marion-countyelection-board (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (outlining harms of upholding Indiana’s
voter ID law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
138. See Lopez, supra note 137 (stating how these laws may restrict access to
voting).
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registration and voting that would have required review by the
federal government. 139
Indiana law required voters to present a valid photo ID at
polling places in order to vote. 140 If voters objected to being
photographed or were unable to present an ID at the polls (even if
they possessed one), they could cast provisional ballots. 141 The
Indiana Democratic Party challenged the law as an infringement
on the right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 142
Indiana argued that the ID requirement was grounded in a
compelling interest to prevent voter fraud and maintain voter
confidence in the electoral process. 143 In sustaining the
constitutionality of the ID requirement, the Court stated:
There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the
State’s interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.
Moreover, the interest in orderly administration and accurate
recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully
identifying all voters participating in the election process. While
the most effective method of preventing election fraud may well
be debatable, the propriety of doing so is perfectly clear. 144

The Court distinguished the voter ID requirement from other
practices that it had struck down or supported. 145 On the one hand,
the Court had struck down the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections 146 as an unconstitutionally discriminatory barrier to
voting. 147 On the other, it had upheld restrictions on write-in
139. See Jamie Fuller, How Has Voting Changed Since Shelby County v.
Holder?, WASH. POST (July 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2014/07/07/how-has-voting-changed-since-shelby-county-vholder/?utm_term=.c53c1f305cb9 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (giving examples of
how the loss of Section 4 has created issues in different states) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
140. See generally Pub. L. 109-2005, 2005 Indiana Acts 2005; see also
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–86 (2008) (describing the
key provisions of Indiana’s voter identification law).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 186–87.
143. Id. at 191–93.
144. Id. at 196.
145. See, e.g., id. at 198 (distinguishing Indiana’s voter ID law from the poll
tax struck down in Harper v. Virginia because Indiana did not require voters to
pay a tax or fee to acquire a new photo ID, but provided them for free).
146. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
147. Id. at 670.
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ballots (Burdick v. Takushi 148) and other “evenhanded restrictions
that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process
itself" as not invidious. 149
The Court acknowledged that the voter ID requirement
“imposes some burdens on voters that other methods of
identification do not share.” 150 Specifically, the Court noted,
a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number
of persons. They include elderly persons born out-of-state, who
may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate; persons who
because of economic or other personal limitations may find it
difficult either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to
assemble the other required documentation to obtain a stateissued identification; homeless persons; and persons with a
religious objection to being photographed. 151

But, the Court said, the severity of this burden was mitigated by
the fact that voters without ID could cast a provisional ballot. 152
Since the evidence presented by the petitioners did not
demonstrate that the voter ID provision had an impact on any
discrete class of voters, the Court saw no reason to strike the law
down. 153
The petitioners also insisted that the law was clearly designed
to harm Democratic voters because the law had been passed
unanimously by the Republican majorities in the state legislature
and opposed with equal unanimity by the Democratic
minorities. 154 But, the Court said, “if a nondiscriminatory law is
supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications
should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may
have provided one motivation for the votes of individual
legislators.” 155

148. 504 U.S. 28 (1992).
149. Crawford v. Marion Cty, Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008).
150. Id. at 197.
151. Id. at 199.
152. Id. at 195.
153. See id. at 202–04 (stating that the law is amply justified by voter
interest).
154. See id. at 188 (describing how a law that made it more difficult for
minorities to vote could adversely affect the Democratic party).
155. Id. at 204.
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Crawford upheld district and appeals court decisions that had
reached the same conclusion. 156 Justice Richard Posner, who wrote
the appeals court decision, subsequently expressed regrets about
doing so. 157 In his book, Reflections on Judging, Posner stated: “I
plead guilty to having written the majority opinion (affirmed by
the Supreme Court) upholding Indiana’s requirement that
prospective voters prove their identity with a photo ID—a type of
law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather
than fraud prevention.” 158
Writing in The New Republic in 2013, Posner insisted that this
was not a recantation of his opinion. 159 Instead, he maintained, it
was an acknowledgment that he—like any other judge—may be
insufficiently knowledgeable about the technical aspects of a
subject to which the law applies that a legal decision made in the
abstract confines of a courtroom might fail to take into account the
decision’s consequences. 160 Accordingly, Posner said essentially
that he made the wrong decision for the right reasons: “We judges
weren’t given, in Crawford, the data we would have needed to
balance the good and bad effects of the Indiana law.” 161 Insofar as
the evidence against the law was, at the time, “totally unreliable,”
Posner asserted that there were no grounds on which to strike it
down. 162 To have done so, he argued “would have plunged the
federal courts deeply into the management of the electoral
process.” 163
Posner cited Richard Trotter’s “Vote of Confidence: Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board, Voter Identification Laws and
the Suppression of a Structural Right” 164 to demonstrate the
156. Id. at 188–89.
157. See generally RICHARD POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 84–85 (2013).
158. Id.
159. See Richard Posner, I Did Not ‘Recant’ on Voter ID Laws, NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 27, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/115363/richard-posner-i-did-notrecant-my-opinion-voter-id (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining that the
controversial sentence in Reflections on Judging had been taken out of context)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See generally Richard Trotter, Vote of Confidence: Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board, Voter Identification Laws, and the Suppression of a
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dilemmas judges find themselves in when dealing with highly
technical or discrete applications of the law. 165 According to
Trotter, Crawford is ripe to be overturned because “[t]he
evidentiary gaps that proved decisive in Crawford were a product
of the relative novelty of voter identification laws and the lack of
mainstream scholarly and journalistic attention dedicated to its
potential effects.” 166 Between the Crawford decision and 2012,
when Trotter was writing, 34 states had introduced voter ID laws
and 7 had signed them into law. 167
Fortunately, the wave of legislation attempting to restrict
access to voting seems to be receding. 168 In several recent cases,
lower courts have struck down restrictive voter registration and
identification requirements in North Carolina, Texas and
Wisconsin. 169 In North Carolina, the United States Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned a district court ruling that had
sustained the constitutionality of several voter registration
restrictions passed under the auspices of a fifty-seven-page
omnibus bill. 170 After spending about fifty-five pages documenting
actions by the state legislature that were clearly designed to
restrict access to the polls in manners that disproportionately
discriminated against African Americans, the court stated:
The totality of the circumstances—North Carolina’s history of
voting discrimination; the surge in African American voting; the
legislature’s knowledge that African Americans voting
translated into support for one party; and the swift elimination
of the tools African Americans had used to vote and imposition
of a new barrier at the first opportunity to do so—cumulatively
and unmistakably reveal that the [Republican majority in the]
Structural Right, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2013).
165. See Posner, supra note 159 159(recalling the dearth of research available
on voter identification when Crawford was decided).
166. Trotter, supra note 164, at 538.
167. Id.
168. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 243–44
(4th Cir. 2016) (striking down restrictive voter registration and identification
laws).
169. See generally id.; Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. Tex. 2016);
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
170. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216 (explaining that, after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Shelby County essentially lifted the preclearance regime, the North
Carolina legislature “swiftly expanded an essentially single-issue bill into
omnibus legislation.”).
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General Assembly used SL 2013-381 to entrench itself. It did so
by targeting voters who, based on race, were unlikely to vote for
the majority party. 171

The court distinguished its reasoning from that employed by the
Supreme Court in Crawford. 172 In McCrory, there was no reason to
defer to legislative considerations about voter fraud. 173
That deference does not apply here because the evidence in this
case establishes that, at least in part, race motivated the North
Carolina legislature. Thus, we do not ask whether the State has
an interest in preventing voter fraud—it does—or whether a
photo ID requirement constitutes one way to serve that
interest—it may—but whether the legislature would have
enacted SL 2013-381’s photo ID requirement if it had no
disproportionate impact on African American voters. The record
establishes that it would not have. 174

One would hope that legislators are no longer motivated by
racially discriminatory intentions. 175 But, the North Carolina story
demonstrates that this is a quixotic hope at least for the time
being. 176 McCrory therefore highlights the impact of the Supreme
Court’s decision to declare Section 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional
in Shelby. 177 The Court struck down Section 4(b), which provided
the coverage formula used to identify the jurisdictions covered by
Section 5’s preclearance regime, because the Court found that the
criteria used were terribly outdated:
Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated
practices. The formula captures States by reference to literacy
171. Id. at 233.
172. See id. at 235 (noting that, in Crawford, the Supreme Court gave
deference to the Indiana legislature’s decision to implement a voter ID law as the
best way to serve its legitimate interest in combatting voter fraud and promoting
public confidence in the state’s electoral system).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. HANS VON SPAKOVSKY, ELIZABETH SLATTERY & ROGER CLEGG, WHAT
CONGRESS CAN DO TO STOP RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 7,
2014),
http://www.heritage.org/civil-rights/report/what-congress-can-do-stopracial-discrimination.
176. See id. (showing how a legislator recently was motivated by racial
discrimination).
177. See id. (demonstrating how a legislator was able to make a law that was
discriminatory).
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tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 1960s and
early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for
over 40 years. And voter registration and turnout numbers in
the covered States have risen dramatically in the years since.
Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence
justifying the preclearance remedy and the coverage formula.
There is no longer such a disparity.
In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with
a recent history of voting tests and low voter registration and
turnout, and those without those characteristics. Congress
based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation
is no longer divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act
continues to treat it as if it were. (internal citations omitted). 178

While the Shelby decision made sense in theory, it provides
another Posnerian example of judges being insufficiently aware of
the consequences of their decisions. 179 Absent the Shelby decision,
North Carolina’s legislature would have been required by Section
5 of the VRA to submit such widespread voting legislation to the
Department of Justice for preclearance, where it is likely the DOJ
would have raised objections to the same voting restrictions later
struck down by the Fourth Circuit. 180 In McCrory, the Fourth
Circuit extensively documented how the Shelby decision
precipitated the expansion and passage of “the most restrictive
voting legislation seen in North Carolina since the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.” 181 While the Supreme Court would
hope that the VRA has achieved its goals, the events in North
Carolina demonstrate that this is not the case. 182
If any good news is emanating from the area of voting rights
despite the impact of Shelby, it is the fact that the forces of
enhancing voter access seem to be advancing. According to the
Brennan Center, in the first three months of 2016,
“422 bills to enhance voting access were introduced or carried over
178. Id. at 2027–28.
179. Compare Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15 with Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013).
180. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 227 (4th
Cir. 2016) (“The record shows that, immediately after Shelby County, the General
Assembly vastly expanded an earlier photo ID bill and rushed [it] through the
legislative process . . . .”).
181. Id.
182. Compare id. with Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 2633 (stating the VRA’s goals).
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in 41 states plus the District of Columbia. Meanwhile, at
least 77 bills to restrict access to registration and voting have been
introduced or carried over from the prior session in 28 states.” 183
Legislation to promote or establish automatic voter registration
was advancing in twenty-eight states and the District of
Columbia. 184 Unfortunately, twenty states have enacted new
restrictions on voting since 2010. 185 Without the potent weapon of
preclearance, which deterred states from enacting broad voting
restrictions, the federal government cannot take action against
discriminatory state election laws until they have gone into effect
and, even at that point, a plaintiff seeking to challenge a voting
restriction must be able to prove that the law was motivated by
discriminatory intent or has had a clear discriminatory impact. 186
IV. The Electoral College
The Electoral College came under fire in 2016 because Donald
Trump was elected with a majority of the Electoral College vote
despite receiving more than 2 million fewer votes than Hillary
Clinton. 187 This precipitated renewed calls for reform and a change
to some form of a national popular vote mechanism to elect the
president. 188
183. Voting Laws Roundup 2016, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-laws-roundup-2016 (last visited
Apr. 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Lopez, supra note 137 (critiquing the method by which to challenge
restrictive voting laws).
187. See Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote,
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popularvote-final-count/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that Clinton outpaced Trump
by almost 2.9 million votes in the 2016 Presidential election) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
188. See Igor Bobic, Democrats Push For Electoral College Reform After
Hillary Clinton’s Popular Vote Victory, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/electoral-college-popular-votereform_us_58471c4be4b0ebac58070c85 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that a
group of House Democrats gathered shortly after the election result to discuss
reforms to the way the country elects its president) (on file with the Washington
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The Electoral College reminds us that there can be many
forms of democracy and elections. 189 Not all are simple,
majoritarian systems. 190 In the United States, the reasoning for
the Electoral College (and the governmental structure on which it
is based) is grounded in the reasoning that informed the
establishment of the Constitution. 191
In Federalist 10, James Madison set forth a vision of politics
that was intended to constrain the will of the majority. 192 The large
republic that the country would be in the late 18th century would
proliferate interest groups (Madison’s “factions”) and therefore
make it extraordinarily difficult for a majority to form. 193 If one did
form around a particular issue, Madison expected that it would
quickly dissolve because other issues would divide it. 194
The separation of powers among the three branches of the
federal government and the division of powers between the states
and the federal government were also designed to make governing
difficult. 195 Specifically, the bicameral Congress was designed to
give states equal representation in the Senate regardless of their
size. 196
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
189. See
Electoral
College,
HISTORY.COM,
http://www.history.com/topics/electoral-college (last visited Apr. 19, 2017)
(describing different methods of election the United States used to implement
prior to enactment of Twelfth Amendment) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
190. See Charles King, Electoral Systems, GEORGETOWN UNIV. (2000),
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm (last visited Apr.
19, 2017) (detailing three different types of electoral systems) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
191. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (replacing the original method of electing the
President and Vice President with separate ballots for President and Vice
President, with electors casting a single vote for each office).
192. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (fearing that the classes
without property would use their majority power to implement a variety of
measures that redistributed wealth).
193. See id. (addressing the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the
republic).
194. See id. (expecting that small democracy means that undesirable passions
can very easily spread to a majority of the people).
195. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (writing to inform the
reader of the safeguards created by the convention to maintain the separate
branches of government).
196. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (stating that if “every
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There is no question that this constitutional structure,
however democratic, does not treat voters equally in all
circumstances; instead, it tends to under-represent the voting
power of large states while over-representing the voting power of
smaller ones 197 For instance, Wyoming has the same number of
senators to represent its 586,107 residents that California has to
represent 39,144,818 residents. 198 The same type of disparity can
be seen in the electoral college system for United States
presidential elections, where each state is apportioned the number
of electors equal to the size of its Congressional delegation. 199
Wyoming receives one electoral vote for every 195,369 residents,
while Californian receives one electoral vote for every 678,945
residents. 200
Were a presidential election result to produce no Electoral
College winner, the Constitution dictates that the top three
candidates (in terms of Electoral Votes) would then contest the
election in the House of Representatives. 201 Were this to occur,
district ought to have a proportional share in the government” and the States
“however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils,”
then “the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of
proportional and equal representation.”).
197. See Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate,
TIMES
(Mar.
11,
2013),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/11/us/politics/democracytested.html?_r=0#/#smallstate (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“Vermont’s 625,000
residents have two United States senators, and so do New York’s 19 million. That
means that a Vermonter has 30 times the voting power in the Senate of a New
Yorker”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
198. See id. (noting that Wyoming and California have the largest
representational inequality gap in the Senate).
199. See id. (“The advantage small states enjoy in the Senate is echoed in the
Electoral College, where each state is allocated votes not only for its House
members (reflecting the state’s population) but also for its senators (a two-vote
bonus).”).
200. See Katy Collin, The Electoral College Badly Distorts the Vote. And It’s
POST
(Nov.
17,
2016),
About
to
Get
Worse,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/17/the-electoralcollege-badly-distorts-the-vote-and-its-going-to-get-worse/?utm_term=.73a341b086
44 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (describing the apportionment of electoral votes for
Wyoming and California) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
201. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“[A]nd if no person have such majority, then
from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of
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each state delegation to the House would cast one vote. 202
Accordingly, lone representatives of states like Wyoming, the
Dakotas and Delaware would cast their votes while California’s 55
representatives would have to caucus and vote to decide which
candidate would receive their one, lone vote. 203
The House itself is hardly a bastion of equality. 204 Montana,
with 994,416 residents has one representative. 205 Meanwhile,
Rhode Island with 1,055,247 residents sends two representatives
to the House. 206

those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President.”).
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“But in choosing the President, the votes
shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote.”).
203. See Electoral College Information, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/electoral-college/ (detailing how the state of
California’s 55 representatives elect the President) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
204. See infra notes 205–06 (showing that although both Montana and Rhode
Island have comparable population size, their allotted number of Representatives
in the House differ).
205. See Montana, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/
MT (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that there is one United States House
Representative in Montana) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
206. See Rhode Island, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
members/RI (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (stating that there are two United States
House Representatives in Rhode Island) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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Residents per House Seat v. Size of HR delegation
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In isolation, the United States would appear to be a terribly
undemocratic, gerrymandered legislative and electoral system
that favors Republican and rural voters. 207 But, if we broaden our
scope of inquiry, we see that the deviations from pure, democratic
equality are common in many federal nations.
Canada suffers similar disparities of representation in the
House of Commons. 208 Ontario, with 13,983,000 residents, has 121
seats in the Commons for a ratio of 115,562 residents per seat. 209
Meanwhile, Nunavut’s 37,100 residents have one member in the

207. See Dylan Matthews, The Senate Is Undemocratic and It Matters, VOX
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/6/7500935/trende-senate-vote-share
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (suggesting that because small states do not have a lot
of heavily populated cities, when they ‘district by state,’ they effectively district
in a way that favors rural, conservative-leaning areas) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
208. See LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, GUIDE TO THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS
3–4 (2016), http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/GuideToHoC/pdf/guide_
canadian_house_of_commons-e.pdf (describing Canada’s bicameral legislative
structure, comprised of the Senate and House of Commons, which are generally
analogous to the United States Senate and House).
209. See id. (noting the allocation of seats in the House of Commons per
province, including Ontario’s 121 allocated seats).
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House of Commons and roughly three times the voting power of
the average Ontarian. 210
Representation in Canada's House of Commons
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Finally,
the
European
Parliament
manifests
similar
representational disparities. 211 Tiny Malta, with a population of
429,344 has six seats in the parliament for a ratio of 71,557
residents per seat. 212 On the other hand, 81,197,537 Germans have
ninety-six seats in the Parliament. 213 With a ratio of 845,808
210. See id. (indicating that Nunavut is allocated only one seat in the
Commons).
211. See MEPs, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meps/en/map.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (explaining that the European
Parliament is comprised of 751 Members elected by the 28 Member-States of the
European Union and that seats are allocated based on Member-State population)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
212. See Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/figures/living_en#tab-1–3 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (indicating
that Malta’s population is 429,344) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice); MEPs by Member State and Political Group:
8th Parliamentary Term, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/meps/en/crosstable.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (indicating that Malta is
allocated six seats in the European Parliament).
213. See Living in the EU, supra note 212 (indicating that Germany’s
population is 81,197,537); MEPs by Member State and Political Group, supra note
212 (noting that Germany is allocated 96 seats in the European Parliament).
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residents per seat, Germans have less than one-eleventh of the
voting power of the Maltese. 214
Such population disparities exist in systems that are designed
to ensure meaningful representation of constituent interests
(states, provinces or countries) in addition to individual voter
equality. In all three legislatures, the smaller constituencies have
far greater voting power than the larger ones. 215 Ironically, this
sort of representation manifests the values that Lani Guinier
advocated in “The Triumph of Tokenism.” 216 There, she called for
“proportionate
interest
representation,”
a
scheme
of
representation that, essentially, over-represents minorities in
order to give them a more effective presence in legislatures. 217
Guinier wrote with regard to the plight of racial minorities in
electorates that are polarized along racial lines. 218 In rejecting the
black electoral success theory’s reliance on or satisfaction with
merely electing a number of minority legislators (roughly)
proportional to the minority percentage of the population, Guinier
called for the adjustment of voting rules in the legislature to
enhance the influence of minority representatives:
Where majority representatives refuse to bargain with
representatives of the minority, simple majority vote rules
would be replaced. “A minority veto” for legislation of vital
importance to minority interests would respond to evidence of
gross “deliberative gerrymanders.” Alternatively, depending on
the proof of disproportionate majority power, plaintiffs might
seek minority
assent
through other supermajority

214. Id.

215. See supra notes 203197–07 (United States), 208208–10 (Canada),
211211–13 (European Union) and accompanying text.
216. See generally Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 15.
217. See id. at 1136 (“Proportionate interest representation disavows the
pluralist conception of fairness, which falsely assumes equal bargaining power
simply based on access, or numerically proportionate electoral success for all
groups.”).
218. See id. at 1125 (“Given residential segregation, the assumption supports
district election structures to reconfigure a heterogeneous, polarized electorate
into a homogeneous one. The assumption correctly perceives that district
elections favor black electoral success “because black candidates seeking district
seats can steer clear of direct competition with white candidates.”).
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arrangements, concurrent legislative majorities, consociational
arrangements, or rotation in office. 219

To the extent that the Electoral College constrains majorities and
over-represents the power and influence of small states, it
embraces at least some of Guinier’s approach to representative
fairness. 220 It compels majorities in the House of Representatives
and the Senate to work with minorities (small states), it provides
incentives for presidential candidates to campaign in small states
and, occasionally, elects a president with a majority of the
Electoral College but not the popular vote. 221
V. Conclusion
My review of these three aspects of contemporary election law
is not meant to suggest that other aspects are not important. But,
these three issues embody talismanic concerns about democratic
integrity. VRA litigation has only enhanced and normalized brazen
gerrymandering practices that serve the interests of legislators,
but not necessarily the voters who elect them. The Supreme
Court’s decision to strike down section 4 of the VRA (and thereby
render Section 5 meaningless) unleashed a wave of legislative
attempts to restrict access to the polls that were clearly designed
to discriminate on the basis of race and partisanship. While the
Electoral College has come under fire due to the way it functioned
in the 2016 presidential election, it is ironic to realize that its
promotion of the power of smaller states manifests the same vision
of minority representation rights that informs Lani Guinier’s
criticism of American voting rights litigation.
Democratic theory is complex and rife with competing values
that do not necessarily complement one another. 222 The Electoral
219. Id. at 1140.
220. See id. at 1090 (“For the integrationist, litigation to achieve black
electoral success incorporated the preeminent process theory of empowerment:
measuring political equality by the fairness of the process through which
representatives were elected.”).
221. See, e.g., Gregory Krieg, supra note 187 (stating that, in the 2016 United
States presidential election, Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidate, won
almost 2.9 million more votes than Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, but
lost the electoral college, 232 to 306, thereby losing the presidential election).
222. See Norman Daniels, Democratic Equality: Rawl’s Complex
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College manifests that complexity. The current state of
redistricting law demonstrates how legislation such as the Voting
Rights Act can be hijacked at the expense of voters. The attempts
to restrict access to the polls in the wake of Shelby remind us of
James Madison’s observation about human nature:
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal constraints on government would be necessary. 223

Despite the existence of the internal constraints on government
that Madison and the Framers designed, the current state of
election law demonstrates that angels do not govern the rules of
the American electoral process.

Egalitarianism,
HARVARD
T.H.
CHAN
SCH.
OF
PUB.
HEALTH,
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/benchmark/ndaniels/pdf/democratic_equality.pdf
(writing that democratic theory is complex because it is “motivated by several
distinct egalitarian ideas” and rests on “three principles of justice that interact
with and limit each other.”).
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).

